DNA, Human Rights and The Criminal Justice System
[1997] AJHR 11; (1997) 3(2) AJHR 208
Hocking, Barbara Ann; McCallum, Hamish; Smith, Alison; Butler, Chris
Sunday, February 1, 2009
Legal Challenge to Athletes Whereabouts System
A number of news reports concerning the legal challenge to the Whereabouts system in Europe. Let's keep an eye on this.
BBC Legal threat to anti-doping code
IHT Doping notes: WADA seeks special meeting
ESPN WADA: We'll discuss 'whereabouts' rule
FIFPro Legal Threat to anti doping code
BBC Legal threat to anti-doping code
IHT Doping notes: WADA seeks special meeting
ESPN WADA: We'll discuss 'whereabouts' rule
FIFPro Legal Threat to anti doping code
The blood profiles of cyclists are providing evidence of doping
Nicole Jeffery, doping | January 27, 2009
Article from: The Australian
THE first case of a cyclist being charged with doping on the evidence of his blood profile is expected to be prosecuted in the coming months, according to Australian anti-doping expert Robin Parisotto.
The International Cycling Union (UCI) has been building up blood profiles of its professional cyclists by taking thousands of blood samples over the past year.
Canberra scientist Parisotto, who sits on the UCI panel overseeing the anti-doping program, said yesterday more than 30 suspicious samples had been analysed and there was enough evidence to pursue a handful of riders for doping violations.
"We are only collating the results now but I expect in the next few months the UCI will be taking action against some cyclists," Parisotto said.
The blood profiling is designed to identify any cyclists using banned drugs or methods which manipulate the blood to improve endurance. He said suspicious samples usually contained high haemoglobin levels, or unusually low levels (which would indicate a cyclist was extracting blood to be re-injected during competition).
"There are discussions now about which are the strongest cases to go after," Parisotto said.
"There's only a handful they can confidently follow up. But I believe in some cases the results are fairly strong and the athlete will have a hard time explaining them."
The first cycling case will be a test for this new method of identifying drug cheats.
Parisotto said there was a smaller number of suspicious samples than he would have expected if the program had been in operation three or four years earlier.
"Now there is more of an effort being made to weed out the cheats and I think some of them are getting scared," he said.
"The risk of getting caught is becoming much greater now that they have to worry about what's in their blood."
Parisotto, who developed one of the first tests for the blood booster EPO in the lead-up to the Sydney Olympics, is also working on the next weapon in the anti-doping war, genetic profiling.
"The technology is there now to do gene profiling on blood tests," Parisotto said.
He said any use of blood doping would show up in changes to an individual's gene activity.
The laboratories will just have to chart the abnormal changes that the drugs make to the blood and genes of the athlete.
Article from: The Australian
THE first case of a cyclist being charged with doping on the evidence of his blood profile is expected to be prosecuted in the coming months, according to Australian anti-doping expert Robin Parisotto.
The International Cycling Union (UCI) has been building up blood profiles of its professional cyclists by taking thousands of blood samples over the past year.
Canberra scientist Parisotto, who sits on the UCI panel overseeing the anti-doping program, said yesterday more than 30 suspicious samples had been analysed and there was enough evidence to pursue a handful of riders for doping violations.
"We are only collating the results now but I expect in the next few months the UCI will be taking action against some cyclists," Parisotto said.
The blood profiling is designed to identify any cyclists using banned drugs or methods which manipulate the blood to improve endurance. He said suspicious samples usually contained high haemoglobin levels, or unusually low levels (which would indicate a cyclist was extracting blood to be re-injected during competition).
"There are discussions now about which are the strongest cases to go after," Parisotto said.
"There's only a handful they can confidently follow up. But I believe in some cases the results are fairly strong and the athlete will have a hard time explaining them."
The first cycling case will be a test for this new method of identifying drug cheats.
Parisotto said there was a smaller number of suspicious samples than he would have expected if the program had been in operation three or four years earlier.
"Now there is more of an effort being made to weed out the cheats and I think some of them are getting scared," he said.
"The risk of getting caught is becoming much greater now that they have to worry about what's in their blood."
Parisotto, who developed one of the first tests for the blood booster EPO in the lead-up to the Sydney Olympics, is also working on the next weapon in the anti-doping war, genetic profiling.
"The technology is there now to do gene profiling on blood tests," Parisotto said.
He said any use of blood doping would show up in changes to an individual's gene activity.
The laboratories will just have to chart the abnormal changes that the drugs make to the blood and genes of the athlete.
Friday, January 30, 2009
Doping and Australian Professional Cycling: Full Text
version en español
Submission to the Commonwealth Department of Health Anti Doping Research Program by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law
Project Summary
Cycling has a reputation as having an entrenched doping culture existing within a closed community where some bending of the rules has been seen as historically permissible, if not required in order to cope with the exceptional nature of its events. The closed nature of the peloton is regarded as being one of the greatest challenges for any intervention initiated from the outside (see Dauncey, 2003; Schneider, 2006). The objective of this research is to examine the attitudes of Australia professional cyclists ("the Australian peloton") and those that they interact with including team managers and staff, sporting and medical advisors, sporting administrators, sponsors and government (“their cohort”). This research is critical given the current doping policy paradigm, its operation, effectiveness and limitations. This study seeks to identify factors which lead to the current anti doping regime to be less effective than desired and to propose practical measures to increase that effectiveness.
Currently the Australian peloton includes at least 30 members racing in European based professional teams and another 80 members riding in continental professional teams outside of Europe. In 2007, Australia was ranked 3rd in the world and 4th following the 2008 World Championships. Given the long history of interaction between professional cycling in Australia and the rest of the world, particularly Europe, the Australia peloton provides an experienced but manageable sized group with which to engage in order to undertake such a project. Furthermore, given the history of interaction with Europe and other parts of the cycling world, there is nothing to suggest that the Australia situation vis a vis doping and attitudes to anti-doping policy are any different within the Australian peloton than any other highly ranked cycling nation.
Over the past decade the sport has been subjected to a number of internal crises and increasing external scrutiny. Nevertheless the problem of doping and how effectively to deal with it remain an important and unresolved issue. The last ten years have seen increased scrutiny of professional cycling, in a large part due to the events of the 1998 Tour de France involving the Festina and other teams. In fact this event is in part credited with the movement towards the formation of WADA. More recently there has been the Operacion Puerto enquiry in Spain, and the successive problems associated with the last three editions of the Tour de France (2006 – Landis; 2007 – Rasmussen, Vinokourov, Mayo; 2008 - Kohl, Schumacher, Ricco & Piepoli) which have raised the issue as to the effectiveness of current anti doping policy and its attempts at changing behaviour in relation to doping practices within cycling.
The observations of Schneider (2006) concerning the closed nature of the peloton as a barrier to change are enlightening in the context of the developments of anti-doping policy over the last 10 years. During this time outside intervention has taken the form of criminal investigations, the development of a World Anti Doping Agency and Code, the changing nature and frequency of testing within cycling and the development of biological passports. As can be seen from this brief list, anti doping policy has been concerned primarily with detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment. In short, anti doping has been a policing activity, and as such it appears to have failed to engage those who are the objects of that activity, nor has it led to broad cultural change within the sport. It is arguable that these measures have in fact contributed towards the peloton becoming even more closed and as a result incapable of fully grasping the nature of the changes occurring within the sport.
Without engaging cyclists (other than as objects of surveillance and prosecution) it is arguable that it is becoming evident to sporting administrators that the current anti doping policy pursued within the sport of cycling is not as effective as it could be and has not as yet led to widespread cultural change of attitudes within the peloton. Without more education it is arguable that such a policy is unsustainable. This is compounded when it is noted that a great deal of the current policy has been formulated as a result of media and related crises within cycling. Schneider (2006) has remarked that the history of the nature of the problem of doping in cycling is constructed in large part from the extensive media coverage of it. As a result of policy being media or crisis driven it appears that little sociological or legal research has been undertaken which considers the relationship between those who are the object of this policing and those who are doing the policing.
Due to the forces of globalisation there are real processes occurring which interact with and effect the development of elite sport policy globally. The current context and changes occurring within professional cycling may well be characterised as processes of structural re-adjustment whereby the old European based cycling economy is being subjected to the pressures of the globalisation of the sport. Anti-doping policy and the fact that cycling is in the ‘eye of the storm’ has to be viewed within this context. These factors not only include the substantive policy framework in terms of an increasingly global anti doping legislative regime but also the discursive construction of those processes within subsystems, communities and the media. As both Houlihan (2005) and Schneider (2006) have noted to some extent, it is the discursive constructions that tend to shape and mediate policy production processes. Dauncey (2003) has also recognised that cycling has a particularly complicated normative framework or frameworks. He has identified at least four normative frameworks that constrain and direct participation in an event such as the Tour de France including the rules of the race, the rules of society, culture and politics, international views on sports and ethics and the internal rules of the peloton itself. Within these frameworks there exist a number of groups that form a broad policy community or communities. However, not all actors within the purview of such communities are able to openly voice their concerns within such a community, especially when one of those policy communities, the peloton, seeks to protect its interests through silence.
In undertaking this research the project will adopt and apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Houlihan (2005) in his work on elite sports policy development. The ACF framework will also be informed by practice, context and the notions of reflexive sociology pursued by Bourdieu (1992, 1990). The ACF focuses upon identifying the dominant policy paradigms that set the parameters for any policy change and the discursive story lines or rationales of those involved in or affected by policy development. Finally the ACF model proposes the concept of policy brokerage in order to engage those involved in and affected by policy changes in order to achieve the neatest possible marriage between the rhetoric of the policy and the reality of the practice it seeks to address.
Research Aims and Objectives
Aims:
* To examine the dominant paradigm, its rationales and focus for anti doping policy affecting Australian professional cyclists ("the Australian peloton");
* To determine the policy and normative framework, its current form and the changes it has undergone in the medium long term;
* To identify the story lines which support the various positions within the sport, and in particular those of the cyclists comprising the Australian peloton;
* To propose measures by which the gap between the reality of the cyclists practice and culture and the rhetoric of the dominant anti doping paradigm may be reduced.
* To ascertain the potential for policy brokerage within the existing policy and normative framework;
* To assess the potential for practical implementation and export of the model to the international professional cycling tours.
Objectives:
* To examine into the attitudes of Australian professional cyclists ("the Australian peloton") and those that they interact with (team managers and staff, sporting and medical advisors, sporting administrators, sponsors and government – “their cohort”) in relation to the current doping paradigm, its operations, effectiveness and problems;
* To identify factors which lead to the current anti doping regime to be less effective than desired and to propose practical measures to increase that effectiveness;
* To clearly identify and define the international, national, public, civil, criminal and sporting norms and policies (“the normative framework”) that the Australian peloton is subject to;
* To gather evidence concerning the complexity of the current normative framework so that it can be better understood.
* To identify the rationales and specific focus of each instrument contained in the normative framework and to analyse their influence on policy formulation and their contribution to the practical effectiveness of anti doping policy.
* To identify and explain structural relationships in policy networks, communities and advocacy coalitions.
* To pursue an explanation and critical evaluation of the social phenomena, their associated practices and the material structures which they produce, which in turn helps sustain those practices.
* To apply factors identified in this study when formulating ways in which to make anti doping policy may be made more practically effective.
* To identify the range of possible policy options that may improve the effectiveness or perception of effectiveness of anti-doping policy.
* To facilitate a means by which the closed peloton may be able to engage in dialogue with those who have the ultimate responsibility for setting the policy framework without the fear of retribution.
* To consider the relationship between those who are the object of the policing and those who are doing the policing and the attitudes and practices of those that are sought to be policed to that activity.
* To understand the place of the core actors (the pro cyclists) within the policy context within which they operate and to facilitate brokerage between those actors and the administrative, sporting, policy, government and commercial actors with whom they interact.
Proposed Methodology
In undertaking this research the project will adopt and apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Houlihan (2005) in his work on elite sports policy development. The ACF framework will also be informed by practice, context and the notions of reflexive sociology pursued by Bourdieu (1992, 1990).
The ACF focuses upon identifying the dominant policy paradigms that set the parameters for any policy change and the discursive story lines or rationales of those involved in or affected by policy development. Finally, the ACF model proposes the concept of policy brokerage in order to engage those involved in and affected by policy changes in order to achieve the neatest possible marriage between the rhetoric of the policy and the reality of the practice it seeks to address.
Research Methods
The project will involve four primary research methods:
1. Qualitative Document Analysis;
2. Semi Structured Interviews;
3. Workshops and Feedback Loops; and
4. Policy Brokerage.
Qualitative Document Analysis (QDA)
QDA involves the analysis of policy and legal documents and the sedimentations of social and political practices that they contain.
One of the first tasks of the project will be to identify through a process of Qualitative Document Analysis the instruments forming the complete anti-doping normative framework affecting the Australian peloton. This framework consisting of multiple conventions, codes, legislation and sporting rules emanates from multiple geographical (e.g., international, regional, and national) and types (e.g., public, civil, sporting and criminal laws) of jurisdictions. Not only are members of the Australian peloton subject to the norms set out in relation to professional cycling by the international and national governing bodies, the International Cycling Union (UCI) and Cycling Australia (CA), but those instruments themselves exist within the framework of international instruments such as the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) Code and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Charter. Furthermore this framework interacts with public law in Australia by way of the Australian Sports Anti Doping Agency (ASADA) Act and its provisions governing for instance the conduct of appeals in relation to doping offences. However, Australian cyclists throughout the season are also subject to the national laws of other countries and of the organisations that conduct the events in which they compete. In some cases, such as in France and Italy, the homes of two of the three Grand Tours, the Australian peloton is subject to the criminal law as well.
The research will seek to identify the current dominant paradigm (or paradigms) policies, and legal framework of anti doping policy affecting the Australian peloton and the manner in which this set of values and assumptions influence policy choice and personal and administrative practice.
The process of Qualitative Document Analysis sets the ground for the second part of this project involving interviews and workshops with members of the Australian peloton and their cohort. Clearly articulating the basis and rationale for the existing anti-doping policy framework and articulating that to those subject to it will allow subsequent discussions to proceed in an informed manner. As noted above different policy justifications influence the focus of the instruments, the policy and the practice related to them and as such it is argued that an understanding of the situation from the perspective of those subject to such controls and regulation is crucial step towards increasing the practical effectiveness of any such regime.
A question to be ultimately answered by this process is whether a bringing together of the rhetoric of and the practice is possible within the current policy framework and if so how could such a position be brokered within the sport of professional cycling? This part of the project lays the groundwork for such an assessment.
Semi Structured Interviews
Semi structured Interviews will be conducted with both members of the peloton and their cohort. Interviews will be based upon an interview guide and open ended, informal probing in order to facilitate open discussion of the issues. Interviews will be conducted in a secure and confidential manner so as not to compromise the project or the position of those who undertake such interviews. Identities of interviewees will be suitably concealed so as not to compromise their identity or the process of the project. Such steps to ensure confidentiality, security and the immunity from prosecution are crucial in guaranteeing the success of the project and it is argued, in fact, any real and effective cultural change within the peloton.
The focus on policy orientation in the QDA process is a key but its emphasis on medium term rationality needs to be tempered with an acknowledgment that policy actors do not always refer to evidence and the weight of expert opinion. Thus identifying "discursive storylines" is a key to establishing and maintaining both entrenched constraints and facilitating factors within the policy process. These storylines are as much a part of the rules of structure formation that set the limits to policy action, both by defining activities that are acceptable and those that are not, as are the actual policy documents such as the anti-doping codes and other legislative instruments.
The rationale for semi structured interviews is to:
· provide an agent informed understanding of practices and processes;
· allow for distinctions to be made between the policy and legal framework, the rhetoric and the reality of practices;
· attempt to discern the normative values and belief systems underlying the peloton and their cohorts perspectives and understandings of the constraining and/or facilitating factors within the structural context.
·
Questions will relate, but not be limited to perceptions, attitudes and views concerning:
* policy rationale;
* the effects of the changes to policy on practices during the last ten years;
* the effectiveness of current policy;
* the multiplicity and/or inconsistency of different regimes;
* privacy, confidentiality, human rights and free trade;
* concepts such as fair play and cheating;
* the different expectations of sport, of work and business, including the extent to which the structure of the sport as business contributes to an environment which leads to riders being susceptible to illicit performance-enhancing activity;
* the availability of doping and other products and interactions with legal and illegal networks;
* problems related to recovery, stress, medical attention as opposed to doping;
* the normalisation of risk and policy attempts to avoid risk in what amounts to a spectacle of risk;
* the transparency of anti doping procedures and appeal procedures;
* the maintenance of public confidence in the sport; and
* options for future policy and policy brokerage.
*
Workshops and Feedback Loops
As each stage of the project is undertaken it is planned to engage in workshop style meetings with the peloton and cohorts to discuss the progress of the project, its interim findings, and the available options facing the actors at any given time throughout or following the project. Small group and break-out sessions and focus type groups shall be used when necessary.
These mechanisms will also be used as a part of the process of policy brokerage.
Policy Brokerage
Once the QDA and the peloton’s own normative structure has been examined the final element in the ACF framework is that of policy brokerage. In congested policy making systems there is greater scope for individual policy entrepreneurship. The project is premised upon the fact that cycling suffers from a form of policy congestion and a high degree of disassociation between rhetoric and practice and as such offers a high degree of scope for policy brokerage.
One of the objects of the project is to identify what options and potential are available for the formation of a policy that is consistent with both the position of the peloton, of those who administer and make policy in respect of the sport and the actually existing policy framework.
The question which we seek to answer in the end is whether there is a new and/or complementary approach to anti doping available as a result of incorporating the peloton into the process of policy formulation?
Longitudinal Analysis
The project will undertake longitudinal analysis by way of its analysis of the policy framework including the Qualitative Document Analysis and an analysis of key events in the evolution of the policy framework (e.g., the 1998 Tour de France, the instigation of the 50% haematocrit health checks).
Another longitudinal aspect of the project will be by through the interview and workshop timetable which will allow for a feedback loop to be established during the process of the project with the relevant actors and stakeholders so that attitudes, policies and possibilities may be discussed and considered by relevant actors throughout the process.
Measures and Action
The ACF method is highly suited to a project which seeks to propose measures that would lead to practical ways to combat doping in professionals cycling.
By identifying the policy framework and the discursive storylines that support and/or undermine that framework the ACF allows for the identification of means by which actors may engage in policy brokerage. The aim of such brokerage would be to propose possible forms of preventative action that might be taken. The success of the project in the context of the Australian peloton will provide a model which may be adopted and exported by other cycling federations and the UCI as well as other sporting sports.
Given that the project covers the fields of sport sociology, sport law and sport management it has the potential to lead not only to practical measures but also the formulation of new and/or revised policies, legislation, rules and procedures. Nevertheless the core worth of the project may be in the manner in which it can create a space for dialogue and the mediation and brokerage of identified issues.
Submission to the Commonwealth Department of Health Anti Doping Research Program by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law
Project Summary
Cycling has a reputation as having an entrenched doping culture existing within a closed community where some bending of the rules has been seen as historically permissible, if not required in order to cope with the exceptional nature of its events. The closed nature of the peloton is regarded as being one of the greatest challenges for any intervention initiated from the outside (see Dauncey, 2003; Schneider, 2006). The objective of this research is to examine the attitudes of Australia professional cyclists ("the Australian peloton") and those that they interact with including team managers and staff, sporting and medical advisors, sporting administrators, sponsors and government (“their cohort”). This research is critical given the current doping policy paradigm, its operation, effectiveness and limitations. This study seeks to identify factors which lead to the current anti doping regime to be less effective than desired and to propose practical measures to increase that effectiveness.
Currently the Australian peloton includes at least 30 members racing in European based professional teams and another 80 members riding in continental professional teams outside of Europe. In 2007, Australia was ranked 3rd in the world and 4th following the 2008 World Championships. Given the long history of interaction between professional cycling in Australia and the rest of the world, particularly Europe, the Australia peloton provides an experienced but manageable sized group with which to engage in order to undertake such a project. Furthermore, given the history of interaction with Europe and other parts of the cycling world, there is nothing to suggest that the Australia situation vis a vis doping and attitudes to anti-doping policy are any different within the Australian peloton than any other highly ranked cycling nation.
Over the past decade the sport has been subjected to a number of internal crises and increasing external scrutiny. Nevertheless the problem of doping and how effectively to deal with it remain an important and unresolved issue. The last ten years have seen increased scrutiny of professional cycling, in a large part due to the events of the 1998 Tour de France involving the Festina and other teams. In fact this event is in part credited with the movement towards the formation of WADA. More recently there has been the Operacion Puerto enquiry in Spain, and the successive problems associated with the last three editions of the Tour de France (2006 – Landis; 2007 – Rasmussen, Vinokourov, Mayo; 2008 - Kohl, Schumacher, Ricco & Piepoli) which have raised the issue as to the effectiveness of current anti doping policy and its attempts at changing behaviour in relation to doping practices within cycling.
The observations of Schneider (2006) concerning the closed nature of the peloton as a barrier to change are enlightening in the context of the developments of anti-doping policy over the last 10 years. During this time outside intervention has taken the form of criminal investigations, the development of a World Anti Doping Agency and Code, the changing nature and frequency of testing within cycling and the development of biological passports. As can be seen from this brief list, anti doping policy has been concerned primarily with detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment. In short, anti doping has been a policing activity, and as such it appears to have failed to engage those who are the objects of that activity, nor has it led to broad cultural change within the sport. It is arguable that these measures have in fact contributed towards the peloton becoming even more closed and as a result incapable of fully grasping the nature of the changes occurring within the sport.
Without engaging cyclists (other than as objects of surveillance and prosecution) it is arguable that it is becoming evident to sporting administrators that the current anti doping policy pursued within the sport of cycling is not as effective as it could be and has not as yet led to widespread cultural change of attitudes within the peloton. Without more education it is arguable that such a policy is unsustainable. This is compounded when it is noted that a great deal of the current policy has been formulated as a result of media and related crises within cycling. Schneider (2006) has remarked that the history of the nature of the problem of doping in cycling is constructed in large part from the extensive media coverage of it. As a result of policy being media or crisis driven it appears that little sociological or legal research has been undertaken which considers the relationship between those who are the object of this policing and those who are doing the policing.
Due to the forces of globalisation there are real processes occurring which interact with and effect the development of elite sport policy globally. The current context and changes occurring within professional cycling may well be characterised as processes of structural re-adjustment whereby the old European based cycling economy is being subjected to the pressures of the globalisation of the sport. Anti-doping policy and the fact that cycling is in the ‘eye of the storm’ has to be viewed within this context. These factors not only include the substantive policy framework in terms of an increasingly global anti doping legislative regime but also the discursive construction of those processes within subsystems, communities and the media. As both Houlihan (2005) and Schneider (2006) have noted to some extent, it is the discursive constructions that tend to shape and mediate policy production processes. Dauncey (2003) has also recognised that cycling has a particularly complicated normative framework or frameworks. He has identified at least four normative frameworks that constrain and direct participation in an event such as the Tour de France including the rules of the race, the rules of society, culture and politics, international views on sports and ethics and the internal rules of the peloton itself. Within these frameworks there exist a number of groups that form a broad policy community or communities. However, not all actors within the purview of such communities are able to openly voice their concerns within such a community, especially when one of those policy communities, the peloton, seeks to protect its interests through silence.
In undertaking this research the project will adopt and apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Houlihan (2005) in his work on elite sports policy development. The ACF framework will also be informed by practice, context and the notions of reflexive sociology pursued by Bourdieu (1992, 1990). The ACF focuses upon identifying the dominant policy paradigms that set the parameters for any policy change and the discursive story lines or rationales of those involved in or affected by policy development. Finally the ACF model proposes the concept of policy brokerage in order to engage those involved in and affected by policy changes in order to achieve the neatest possible marriage between the rhetoric of the policy and the reality of the practice it seeks to address.
Research Aims and Objectives
Aims:
* To examine the dominant paradigm, its rationales and focus for anti doping policy affecting Australian professional cyclists ("the Australian peloton");
* To determine the policy and normative framework, its current form and the changes it has undergone in the medium long term;
* To identify the story lines which support the various positions within the sport, and in particular those of the cyclists comprising the Australian peloton;
* To propose measures by which the gap between the reality of the cyclists practice and culture and the rhetoric of the dominant anti doping paradigm may be reduced.
* To ascertain the potential for policy brokerage within the existing policy and normative framework;
* To assess the potential for practical implementation and export of the model to the international professional cycling tours.
Objectives:
* To examine into the attitudes of Australian professional cyclists ("the Australian peloton") and those that they interact with (team managers and staff, sporting and medical advisors, sporting administrators, sponsors and government – “their cohort”) in relation to the current doping paradigm, its operations, effectiveness and problems;
* To identify factors which lead to the current anti doping regime to be less effective than desired and to propose practical measures to increase that effectiveness;
* To clearly identify and define the international, national, public, civil, criminal and sporting norms and policies (“the normative framework”) that the Australian peloton is subject to;
* To gather evidence concerning the complexity of the current normative framework so that it can be better understood.
* To identify the rationales and specific focus of each instrument contained in the normative framework and to analyse their influence on policy formulation and their contribution to the practical effectiveness of anti doping policy.
* To identify and explain structural relationships in policy networks, communities and advocacy coalitions.
* To pursue an explanation and critical evaluation of the social phenomena, their associated practices and the material structures which they produce, which in turn helps sustain those practices.
* To apply factors identified in this study when formulating ways in which to make anti doping policy may be made more practically effective.
* To identify the range of possible policy options that may improve the effectiveness or perception of effectiveness of anti-doping policy.
* To facilitate a means by which the closed peloton may be able to engage in dialogue with those who have the ultimate responsibility for setting the policy framework without the fear of retribution.
* To consider the relationship between those who are the object of the policing and those who are doing the policing and the attitudes and practices of those that are sought to be policed to that activity.
* To understand the place of the core actors (the pro cyclists) within the policy context within which they operate and to facilitate brokerage between those actors and the administrative, sporting, policy, government and commercial actors with whom they interact.
Proposed Methodology
In undertaking this research the project will adopt and apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Houlihan (2005) in his work on elite sports policy development. The ACF framework will also be informed by practice, context and the notions of reflexive sociology pursued by Bourdieu (1992, 1990).
The ACF focuses upon identifying the dominant policy paradigms that set the parameters for any policy change and the discursive story lines or rationales of those involved in or affected by policy development. Finally, the ACF model proposes the concept of policy brokerage in order to engage those involved in and affected by policy changes in order to achieve the neatest possible marriage between the rhetoric of the policy and the reality of the practice it seeks to address.
Research Methods
The project will involve four primary research methods:
1. Qualitative Document Analysis;
2. Semi Structured Interviews;
3. Workshops and Feedback Loops; and
4. Policy Brokerage.
Qualitative Document Analysis (QDA)
QDA involves the analysis of policy and legal documents and the sedimentations of social and political practices that they contain.
One of the first tasks of the project will be to identify through a process of Qualitative Document Analysis the instruments forming the complete anti-doping normative framework affecting the Australian peloton. This framework consisting of multiple conventions, codes, legislation and sporting rules emanates from multiple geographical (e.g., international, regional, and national) and types (e.g., public, civil, sporting and criminal laws) of jurisdictions. Not only are members of the Australian peloton subject to the norms set out in relation to professional cycling by the international and national governing bodies, the International Cycling Union (UCI) and Cycling Australia (CA), but those instruments themselves exist within the framework of international instruments such as the World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) Code and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Charter. Furthermore this framework interacts with public law in Australia by way of the Australian Sports Anti Doping Agency (ASADA) Act and its provisions governing for instance the conduct of appeals in relation to doping offences. However, Australian cyclists throughout the season are also subject to the national laws of other countries and of the organisations that conduct the events in which they compete. In some cases, such as in France and Italy, the homes of two of the three Grand Tours, the Australian peloton is subject to the criminal law as well.
The research will seek to identify the current dominant paradigm (or paradigms) policies, and legal framework of anti doping policy affecting the Australian peloton and the manner in which this set of values and assumptions influence policy choice and personal and administrative practice.
The process of Qualitative Document Analysis sets the ground for the second part of this project involving interviews and workshops with members of the Australian peloton and their cohort. Clearly articulating the basis and rationale for the existing anti-doping policy framework and articulating that to those subject to it will allow subsequent discussions to proceed in an informed manner. As noted above different policy justifications influence the focus of the instruments, the policy and the practice related to them and as such it is argued that an understanding of the situation from the perspective of those subject to such controls and regulation is crucial step towards increasing the practical effectiveness of any such regime.
A question to be ultimately answered by this process is whether a bringing together of the rhetoric of and the practice is possible within the current policy framework and if so how could such a position be brokered within the sport of professional cycling? This part of the project lays the groundwork for such an assessment.
Semi Structured Interviews
Semi structured Interviews will be conducted with both members of the peloton and their cohort. Interviews will be based upon an interview guide and open ended, informal probing in order to facilitate open discussion of the issues. Interviews will be conducted in a secure and confidential manner so as not to compromise the project or the position of those who undertake such interviews. Identities of interviewees will be suitably concealed so as not to compromise their identity or the process of the project. Such steps to ensure confidentiality, security and the immunity from prosecution are crucial in guaranteeing the success of the project and it is argued, in fact, any real and effective cultural change within the peloton.
The focus on policy orientation in the QDA process is a key but its emphasis on medium term rationality needs to be tempered with an acknowledgment that policy actors do not always refer to evidence and the weight of expert opinion. Thus identifying "discursive storylines" is a key to establishing and maintaining both entrenched constraints and facilitating factors within the policy process. These storylines are as much a part of the rules of structure formation that set the limits to policy action, both by defining activities that are acceptable and those that are not, as are the actual policy documents such as the anti-doping codes and other legislative instruments.
The rationale for semi structured interviews is to:
· provide an agent informed understanding of practices and processes;
· allow for distinctions to be made between the policy and legal framework, the rhetoric and the reality of practices;
· attempt to discern the normative values and belief systems underlying the peloton and their cohorts perspectives and understandings of the constraining and/or facilitating factors within the structural context.
·
Questions will relate, but not be limited to perceptions, attitudes and views concerning:
* policy rationale;
* the effects of the changes to policy on practices during the last ten years;
* the effectiveness of current policy;
* the multiplicity and/or inconsistency of different regimes;
* privacy, confidentiality, human rights and free trade;
* concepts such as fair play and cheating;
* the different expectations of sport, of work and business, including the extent to which the structure of the sport as business contributes to an environment which leads to riders being susceptible to illicit performance-enhancing activity;
* the availability of doping and other products and interactions with legal and illegal networks;
* problems related to recovery, stress, medical attention as opposed to doping;
* the normalisation of risk and policy attempts to avoid risk in what amounts to a spectacle of risk;
* the transparency of anti doping procedures and appeal procedures;
* the maintenance of public confidence in the sport; and
* options for future policy and policy brokerage.
*
Workshops and Feedback Loops
As each stage of the project is undertaken it is planned to engage in workshop style meetings with the peloton and cohorts to discuss the progress of the project, its interim findings, and the available options facing the actors at any given time throughout or following the project. Small group and break-out sessions and focus type groups shall be used when necessary.
These mechanisms will also be used as a part of the process of policy brokerage.
Policy Brokerage
Once the QDA and the peloton’s own normative structure has been examined the final element in the ACF framework is that of policy brokerage. In congested policy making systems there is greater scope for individual policy entrepreneurship. The project is premised upon the fact that cycling suffers from a form of policy congestion and a high degree of disassociation between rhetoric and practice and as such offers a high degree of scope for policy brokerage.
One of the objects of the project is to identify what options and potential are available for the formation of a policy that is consistent with both the position of the peloton, of those who administer and make policy in respect of the sport and the actually existing policy framework.
The question which we seek to answer in the end is whether there is a new and/or complementary approach to anti doping available as a result of incorporating the peloton into the process of policy formulation?
Longitudinal Analysis
The project will undertake longitudinal analysis by way of its analysis of the policy framework including the Qualitative Document Analysis and an analysis of key events in the evolution of the policy framework (e.g., the 1998 Tour de France, the instigation of the 50% haematocrit health checks).
Another longitudinal aspect of the project will be by through the interview and workshop timetable which will allow for a feedback loop to be established during the process of the project with the relevant actors and stakeholders so that attitudes, policies and possibilities may be discussed and considered by relevant actors throughout the process.
Measures and Action
The ACF method is highly suited to a project which seeks to propose measures that would lead to practical ways to combat doping in professionals cycling.
By identifying the policy framework and the discursive storylines that support and/or undermine that framework the ACF allows for the identification of means by which actors may engage in policy brokerage. The aim of such brokerage would be to propose possible forms of preventative action that might be taken. The success of the project in the context of the Australian peloton will provide a model which may be adopted and exported by other cycling federations and the UCI as well as other sporting sports.
Given that the project covers the fields of sport sociology, sport law and sport management it has the potential to lead not only to practical measures but also the formulation of new and/or revised policies, legislation, rules and procedures. Nevertheless the core worth of the project may be in the manner in which it can create a space for dialogue and the mediation and brokerage of identified issues.
It's not about the blood - what is Operacion Puerto?
I wrote this a few months ago, no on wants to publish it, but it has made some waves, positive ones .....
The background.
In May 2006 a cd of police documents, what we now know as Operacion Puerto, was leaked to Spain's number one cycling journalist, Carlos Arribas of the daily paper El Pais. The leak subsequently sent the cycling world into turmoil as the extent of the Liberty Seguros program of rider preparation was revealed. Liberty Seguros quickly pulled its sponsorship of Saiz's team as they raced in Italy mid Giro Then other names began to emerge, such as Ullrich and Basso and in the wake of those revelations that year's Tour de France favourite list was cut to shreds. At the centre of the storm was the Spanish doctor (hormone specialist) Dr Eufemiano Fuentes.
The revelation that police had been engaged in surveillance of Fuentes, Saiz and others seems to have emerged because of the intersection of two seemingly unrelated concerns for Spain. One was an ongoing investigation by the Spanish Guardia Civil into the importation of counterfeit or prohibited medicines from sources such as factories in China selling EPO and a wide array of hormone based substances. There have even been hints that there has been an Australian connection to this investigation as investigators sought to trace back the trail of IGH1 which had been entering Spain. It was this illegal importation and subsequent supply that The Guardia Civil were interested in cracking.
In late 2005 this investigation intersected by chance with the disaster that arose for Spanish cycling after Roberto Heras's 2005 Vuelta a España, positive for EPO. The repercussions for Unipublic, the race's organisers, other sponsors and the Spanish state were enormous. Spanish cycling was in real crisis following the Heras positive. He was their one real option of a rider who could conquer the Grand Tours and he was in disgrace.
The evidence of Manolo Saiz given to the Guardia Civil provides some insight into both how the Vuelta disaster came to be and why the Liberty team became entangled in the ongoing investigation into importation.
When detained by the Guardia Civil Manolo Saiz said that he had known the Fuentes since his stint with ONCE in the early 90's. Saiz said that after Fuentes left the team they had occasional personal contact but that it was, in 2004, with his signing of Roberto Heras that the relationship recommenced on more than a friendly level. Saiz said that on his arrival at Liberty from US Postal Service, Heras asked that he be able to have Fuentes as his personal doctor. Heras wanted to deal directly with Fuentes and at first Saiz said no as it didn't seem the best way to manage the team. After much insistence on the part of Heras, Saiz gave in but it seems he decided to try and manage the relationship as best he could. Saiz was insistent in his evidence that it was Heras and other riders in his team who had also previously been in Kelme that pushed for the Fuentes connection. There of course was no love lost between Saiz and Kelme's Vicente Belda during the previous years as Siaz had been instrumental for pushing through the Pro Tour and Kelme's exclusion from it.
With the 2005 Vuelta positive of Heras the Guardia Civil decided to follow the leads and see if their was any link between the EPO being used by cyclists and their investigation. This of course was not the only lead that led them to the trail to the consulting rooms of Fuentes. The year before the Vuelta had been hit by two positives for blood transfusion. The first to break was that of Hamilton, who tested positive following his close September 11 time trial victory over his soon to be teammate again Floyd Landis in Valencia.
The second, the post race revelations concerning Hamilton's teammate Santi Perez. Phonak of course was directed by Kelme's ex Alvaro Pino. Other than the Kelme connection what is interesting is that two out of the three incidents that led the Guardia Civil to stake out Fuentes involved ex US Postal riders – Heras and Hamilton. The files also suggest another link from Hamilton to his friend "Nick" and "Nick's friend". This little mystery has not received the attention that the reference to "Valv Piti" has received by the cycling world. And of course, seemingly outside of the Fuentes affair, the next doping incident to really rock cycling was that of another ex USPS rider, Floyd Landis.
These events involving Heras, Hamilton and Perez drew the Guardia Civil closer and closer to their stakeout of Fuentes.
Puertos Abiertos
In May 2006 Operacion Puerto broke when El Pais published details from the leaked Guardia Civil files. Not only were Liberty Seguros embroiled, but so was Hamilton, Perez, a host of Kelme riders and two of the main challengers for that years Tour de France – Jan Ullrich and Ivan Basso. All of this is old news. We are all now too familiar of the stories of blood bags and nicknames and the speculation that still continues over them. Bags of the evidence have come to light regarding Fuentes and the methods he practiced. The riders both implicated and suspected and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings against many of them have all been in the news.
But the point that is often forgotten in the fog is as far as the Guardia Civil investigation was concerned the cyclists were never suspects. Sure there were bags of evidence implicating various riders in the Fuentes scheme, bringing to light for the first time the details of planning and administration that went on to help produce some 'great' rides. But never was any cyclist charged or likely to be charged with a criminal offence in Spain as a result of Operacion Puerto.
The interest of the Guardia Civil was and has always remained the importation of products from predominantly China and their distribution and administration throughout Spain. The Guardia Civil believed that Fuentes was probably in collaboration with other sports doctors implicated in doping practices and that these doctors and groups that they formed constituted independent but interrelated criminal groups – acting independently but related by their object of providing medical assistance to cyclists.
The conclusion reached by the Guardia Civil was that Fuentes and his gang developed and were involved in the practice of doping which they described as the integral preparation of the riders based on illicit methods using medicines in a manner contrary to Spanish health laws. Put simply the illicit preparation methods of Fuentes used products which were imported into Spain without passing the normal controls applied to the importation of medicines, they were using the medicines for purposes other than those that they were designed, and that many of the products used were beyond their use by date. As the story of Pantani's relationship with Fuentes suggests the practices themselves also raise public health concerns. It is on this basis that the Guardia Civil sought to pursue the charge of endangering public health.
The evidence and the riders.
The cyclists were never themselves under investigation in Operacion Puerto. There was never any plan or suggestion that the cyclists mixed up in the Fuentes practice would be prosecuted in Spain. In part this comes about as a a result of Spanish Governmental policy which seeks to address the doping question by attacking it at its source – the manufacture, importation and distribution of doping products. It is the endangerment of the cyclists health through the administration of dangerous, misused, illegal or out of date medicines that Spanish law seeks to prevent.
But having said that what the cycling world was faced with as a result of the leaking of the investigation was that thousands of pages of evidence and the blood in "siberia" (the Fuentes code for frozen blood) came to light. This material was such that national cycling federations and the international governing body, the UCI, could only ignore it at their peril. In accordance with the WADA Code obligation law enforcement authorities and sporting bodies are under an obligation to share information on doping with other relevant national and international bodies. But even if Spain refused to share the information – which it has not; the Operacion Puerto documents are now so widely available that any federation could have access to them even without the cooperation of the Spanish authorities.
The problem for the federations has been essentially that although much of the evidence concerning the cyclists is prima facie damning the question remained whether or not there was sufficient evidence to obtain a finding of doping. This has been the outcome of many of the disciplinary cases, such as that of Allan Davis – no case to answer or charge not proved. However these legal processes which have been pursued are the only available relevant legal avenues available to the riders in respect of the evidence arising from Operacion Puerto.
The case of Allan Davis illustrates the difficulties of dealing with the evidence, of maintaining confidence in the system, and more importantly how in reality Operacion Puerto has escaped the bounds of law and take on a life of its own within the current 'race wars' being waged by the UCI and race organisers. Whatever has become of Operacion Puerto it is important to always recall that the cyclists were not really cleared of their involvement in the Spanish criminal investigation as they were never suspects in that investigation. This is the importance of the letters from the Spanish judicial system that many carry to prove their 'innocence'. As far as Spanish law is concerned the riders have never needed to prove their innocence.
The Appeal
In 2007 the Investigating Judge Serrano shelved the inquiry. His finding was that he did not have enough evidence to obtain a prosecution against anyone involved as doping was not then a crime in Spain. The endangering public health charge had somehow lost its legs and as a result Puerto for all intents and purposes in Spain was over.
Nevertheless the damage rolled on as riders implicated, who had been cleared by their federations or national anti doping agencies, found it difficult to obtain a ride in a top tier team. Some of course were sanctioned – Ullrich and Basso the highest profile. Others, particularly those from Spain ended up either retiring or racing as refugees in Portugal.
In the end the sanction imposed on most of them has not been that meeted out by the courts, nor their federations, but it has been that dealt to them by the management and sponsors of the Pro Tour teams and the race organisers.. As the case of Allan Davis shows retribution for involvement in Puerto is not legal in the way we used to think about such things. Whatever the legal outcome retribution takes the form of an inability to obtain a contract with a decent team notwithstanding the ASADA finding him as having no case to answer. Some like Davis held out hopes that the Spanish Court of Appeal may give them some hope. But its reopening of the case has only confirmed the position that it is not the riders that the law is interested in.
In February 2008 the Spanish Court of Appeal reopened the case. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence for the endangering public health charge to be pursued and they directed judge Serrano to reopen his investigation into that charge. However, it may be that the most important finding of the Court of Appeal was that the cyclists had never engaged in fraud in respect of their employers or sponsors. This decision is important for riders such as Davis in so far as they continue to suffer at the hands of sponsors who fear the sullying of their good corporate names. The Court of Appeal finding suggests in fact that these very same sponsors have been all to well aware of the practices within their respective teams for too long – and thus are not in a position to have either their name sullied or to be defrauded.
The implication of this finding is clearly that the Court of Appeal felt that it was not only the sponsors that had knowledge of the fact that there had been a number of doping cases in cycling in recent years and that doping existed within cycling. This finding of the Court of Appeals undermines somewhat the rhetoric of cheating and fair play that pervades the discussion around doping in cycling in contemporary times and the situation whereby it is only cyclists who are taking the blame for the problem. For all the talk of cultural change in cycling, there is still little acknowledgment from the various levels of the sport's administration that they too were a part of cycling's old ways.
The Puerto files refers to various media reports, that of Roux, Manzano, Heras, Hamilton and Perez in particular. All of this suggests that widespread use of performance enhancing substances in cycling was common knowledge. Drugs in cycling have a long history. As we know it was Simpson's death that brought the health and safety of the cyclists into focus as anti doping controls developed during the 1960's. Even at the time of the Festina affair the ethos behind anti doping measures was health and safety. Only recently as that focus shifted to the rhetoric of fair play and cheating to be monitored by a bio-political passport regime.
Puerto also reveals a new post Festina 'post-modern' approach to the organisation of doping. Festina became criminalised because of the seizure of various illegal substances in poor old Willy Voet's team car. The riders, including Neil Stephens were held in police detention for days, almost blind Eric Zulle even being deprived of his glasses. The Festina affair exposed the old team based practices of preparation where team doctors themselves were responsible for the team's doping program. In the aftermath of Festina that system began to break down and it seems that is was replaced by a more networked and outsourced preparation system. Operacion Puerto exposes the outsourced network model that has existed in cycling in great detail. It also suggest that Liberty returned to a more team based approach as Saiz was aware of the dangers to his rider's health, not to say the team's reputation, if they were allowed to do their own thing.
Fuentes, Pantani and Chaba
The effect of Fuentes' practices on the health of the riders is one of the issues raised by the continuing post-appeal Guardia Civil investigation. Although there have been suggestions that the Guardia Civil may have investigated the links between Fuentes and Marco Pantani and Jose Maria Jimenez the references to these two riders in the Puerto files have not been widely speculated about in the media. The files call into question the assumption by Matt Rendell in his book, "The Death of Marco Pantani", that in his final year il Pirata was not doping.
Rendell documents Pantani's life during his last year in some detail. The plastic surgery, the outcome of the criminal and disciplinary trials and appeals, the visits to the psychiatrist and his doctors in Italy, the hospitalisations, the crack and cocaine binges, his retirement and final death on 14 February 2004. During this time it was thought that Pantani was, although using crack and cocaine after his retirement, for racing purposes, clean. Rendell recounts how doctors in Italy had warned him that racing itself might not be the best thing for his mental or physical health bu that racing doped was far more dangerous.
Nevertheless, it was in this same period, painstakingly documented by Rendell, that Puerto tells us that Pantani was also visiting Madrid and visiting Dr Fuentes. During Pantani's last season on the bike, the one immediately before his death, commencing late January 2004, Fuentes records set out an intense calendar of preparation including EPO (almost daily for over a month), IGF 1, T3 Levothroid, a hormone used in the treatment of menopause, and Insulin. The program lasted from late January until Pantani's retirement in June.
The coincidence between this program and Pantani's documented incidents of mental instability during his final year raise significant causes for concern as to the health implications of doping. In the context of the investigation into the charge that Fuentes endangered public health, it will be interesting to see if this coincidence or mis-incidence of events in Pantani's last year of life comes to light. And it should not be forgotten that another Fuentes patient who also suffered from depression and instability, Jose Maria Jimenez, died a little over 2 months before Pantani.
Why us?
In any conversation about Operacion Puerto there is always one point that comes up – Why cycling? Why us and not all those other sports that dope? Or that cyclists are the most tested athletes etc etc etc .... Whether details of other athletes were ever found by the Guardia Civil we may never know. If they did and why they have never come to light we can only speculate. But what we can say is that those other sports are far more established on a global scale than cycling is. And they have a different institutional sporting tradition to that of cycling. Unlike the others cycling now finds itself in the midst of a crisis of its globalisation. The change from a relatively small European based business into a global international media spectacle.
Cycling was always professional. The Tour grew out of the media's need to sell newspapers and doping quickly became the way that the "convicts of the route" managed to perform the impossible task set for them. Doping became a part of cycling culture as it operated outside the ethos of the amateur sporting world. Drugs became as one old Aussie pro put it to me the "tools of the trade". Like truckies on speed it was a way of getting the job done.
Cycling has always been run at a grass roots level, small groups, riders, managers, directors, like bands of gypsies. It was never big business – only recently did that occur. Only recently did cycling explode onto the world stage. The Armstrong years saw cycling develop into a global media product and with it a new level of scrutiny grew as the struggle to control the emerging global product intensified..
Cultural change in cycling is being driven by the fight over global cycling tv rights. This is what is at the heart5 of the battle between the Grand Tours and the UCI – a potential multi million dollar tv product in which the Tours which to retain their control over their race and the UCI wish to 'nationalise' or integrate into one grand package. In this situation rumour and suspicion serve as the cipher by which the battle is played out and points are scored against the other side.
In this context of cultural change it is ony the riders being subjected to scrutiny and not those who have managed the sport for many years and who it seem have kown what was happening the whole time. But it is only he cyclists who are risking losing their livelihood. There are exceptions such as with Fuentes or the odd director, but even they come back in one way or another.
True cultural change within cycling depends upon it being accepted that it was not just the cyclists involved in doping. It involves a recognition that the practice was widely known about and accepted by those in the know – administrators, sponsors and the media. But at the moment with the riders being criminalised and those others involved in the sport mouthing the mantras of 'zero tolerance' and 'cultural change' real change is impossible. What is needed is some process of truth and reconciliation within cycling. A moratorium on the old ways on the part of the riders and in turn a moratorium on the persecution of old events. Only with this recognition and by biting the bullet and accepting that we were all a part of the problem can we really have true cultural change in cycling. But none of this can happen when riders are turned into criminals and the organisers of the loggerheads continue to applaud this as they battle it out to be the top dog in a global cycling market. Operacion Puerto and cycling require tough political decisions to be made – by administrators, race organisers and cyclists; the solution will not come about through the law.
The background.
In May 2006 a cd of police documents, what we now know as Operacion Puerto, was leaked to Spain's number one cycling journalist, Carlos Arribas of the daily paper El Pais. The leak subsequently sent the cycling world into turmoil as the extent of the Liberty Seguros program of rider preparation was revealed. Liberty Seguros quickly pulled its sponsorship of Saiz's team as they raced in Italy mid Giro Then other names began to emerge, such as Ullrich and Basso and in the wake of those revelations that year's Tour de France favourite list was cut to shreds. At the centre of the storm was the Spanish doctor (hormone specialist) Dr Eufemiano Fuentes.
The revelation that police had been engaged in surveillance of Fuentes, Saiz and others seems to have emerged because of the intersection of two seemingly unrelated concerns for Spain. One was an ongoing investigation by the Spanish Guardia Civil into the importation of counterfeit or prohibited medicines from sources such as factories in China selling EPO and a wide array of hormone based substances. There have even been hints that there has been an Australian connection to this investigation as investigators sought to trace back the trail of IGH1 which had been entering Spain. It was this illegal importation and subsequent supply that The Guardia Civil were interested in cracking.
In late 2005 this investigation intersected by chance with the disaster that arose for Spanish cycling after Roberto Heras's 2005 Vuelta a España, positive for EPO. The repercussions for Unipublic, the race's organisers, other sponsors and the Spanish state were enormous. Spanish cycling was in real crisis following the Heras positive. He was their one real option of a rider who could conquer the Grand Tours and he was in disgrace.
The evidence of Manolo Saiz given to the Guardia Civil provides some insight into both how the Vuelta disaster came to be and why the Liberty team became entangled in the ongoing investigation into importation.
When detained by the Guardia Civil Manolo Saiz said that he had known the Fuentes since his stint with ONCE in the early 90's. Saiz said that after Fuentes left the team they had occasional personal contact but that it was, in 2004, with his signing of Roberto Heras that the relationship recommenced on more than a friendly level. Saiz said that on his arrival at Liberty from US Postal Service, Heras asked that he be able to have Fuentes as his personal doctor. Heras wanted to deal directly with Fuentes and at first Saiz said no as it didn't seem the best way to manage the team. After much insistence on the part of Heras, Saiz gave in but it seems he decided to try and manage the relationship as best he could. Saiz was insistent in his evidence that it was Heras and other riders in his team who had also previously been in Kelme that pushed for the Fuentes connection. There of course was no love lost between Saiz and Kelme's Vicente Belda during the previous years as Siaz had been instrumental for pushing through the Pro Tour and Kelme's exclusion from it.
With the 2005 Vuelta positive of Heras the Guardia Civil decided to follow the leads and see if their was any link between the EPO being used by cyclists and their investigation. This of course was not the only lead that led them to the trail to the consulting rooms of Fuentes. The year before the Vuelta had been hit by two positives for blood transfusion. The first to break was that of Hamilton, who tested positive following his close September 11 time trial victory over his soon to be teammate again Floyd Landis in Valencia.
The second, the post race revelations concerning Hamilton's teammate Santi Perez. Phonak of course was directed by Kelme's ex Alvaro Pino. Other than the Kelme connection what is interesting is that two out of the three incidents that led the Guardia Civil to stake out Fuentes involved ex US Postal riders – Heras and Hamilton. The files also suggest another link from Hamilton to his friend "Nick" and "Nick's friend". This little mystery has not received the attention that the reference to "Valv Piti" has received by the cycling world. And of course, seemingly outside of the Fuentes affair, the next doping incident to really rock cycling was that of another ex USPS rider, Floyd Landis.
These events involving Heras, Hamilton and Perez drew the Guardia Civil closer and closer to their stakeout of Fuentes.
Puertos Abiertos
In May 2006 Operacion Puerto broke when El Pais published details from the leaked Guardia Civil files. Not only were Liberty Seguros embroiled, but so was Hamilton, Perez, a host of Kelme riders and two of the main challengers for that years Tour de France – Jan Ullrich and Ivan Basso. All of this is old news. We are all now too familiar of the stories of blood bags and nicknames and the speculation that still continues over them. Bags of the evidence have come to light regarding Fuentes and the methods he practiced. The riders both implicated and suspected and the subsequent disciplinary proceedings against many of them have all been in the news.
But the point that is often forgotten in the fog is as far as the Guardia Civil investigation was concerned the cyclists were never suspects. Sure there were bags of evidence implicating various riders in the Fuentes scheme, bringing to light for the first time the details of planning and administration that went on to help produce some 'great' rides. But never was any cyclist charged or likely to be charged with a criminal offence in Spain as a result of Operacion Puerto.
The interest of the Guardia Civil was and has always remained the importation of products from predominantly China and their distribution and administration throughout Spain. The Guardia Civil believed that Fuentes was probably in collaboration with other sports doctors implicated in doping practices and that these doctors and groups that they formed constituted independent but interrelated criminal groups – acting independently but related by their object of providing medical assistance to cyclists.
The conclusion reached by the Guardia Civil was that Fuentes and his gang developed and were involved in the practice of doping which they described as the integral preparation of the riders based on illicit methods using medicines in a manner contrary to Spanish health laws. Put simply the illicit preparation methods of Fuentes used products which were imported into Spain without passing the normal controls applied to the importation of medicines, they were using the medicines for purposes other than those that they were designed, and that many of the products used were beyond their use by date. As the story of Pantani's relationship with Fuentes suggests the practices themselves also raise public health concerns. It is on this basis that the Guardia Civil sought to pursue the charge of endangering public health.
The evidence and the riders.
The cyclists were never themselves under investigation in Operacion Puerto. There was never any plan or suggestion that the cyclists mixed up in the Fuentes practice would be prosecuted in Spain. In part this comes about as a a result of Spanish Governmental policy which seeks to address the doping question by attacking it at its source – the manufacture, importation and distribution of doping products. It is the endangerment of the cyclists health through the administration of dangerous, misused, illegal or out of date medicines that Spanish law seeks to prevent.
But having said that what the cycling world was faced with as a result of the leaking of the investigation was that thousands of pages of evidence and the blood in "siberia" (the Fuentes code for frozen blood) came to light. This material was such that national cycling federations and the international governing body, the UCI, could only ignore it at their peril. In accordance with the WADA Code obligation law enforcement authorities and sporting bodies are under an obligation to share information on doping with other relevant national and international bodies. But even if Spain refused to share the information – which it has not; the Operacion Puerto documents are now so widely available that any federation could have access to them even without the cooperation of the Spanish authorities.
The problem for the federations has been essentially that although much of the evidence concerning the cyclists is prima facie damning the question remained whether or not there was sufficient evidence to obtain a finding of doping. This has been the outcome of many of the disciplinary cases, such as that of Allan Davis – no case to answer or charge not proved. However these legal processes which have been pursued are the only available relevant legal avenues available to the riders in respect of the evidence arising from Operacion Puerto.
The case of Allan Davis illustrates the difficulties of dealing with the evidence, of maintaining confidence in the system, and more importantly how in reality Operacion Puerto has escaped the bounds of law and take on a life of its own within the current 'race wars' being waged by the UCI and race organisers. Whatever has become of Operacion Puerto it is important to always recall that the cyclists were not really cleared of their involvement in the Spanish criminal investigation as they were never suspects in that investigation. This is the importance of the letters from the Spanish judicial system that many carry to prove their 'innocence'. As far as Spanish law is concerned the riders have never needed to prove their innocence.
The Appeal
In 2007 the Investigating Judge Serrano shelved the inquiry. His finding was that he did not have enough evidence to obtain a prosecution against anyone involved as doping was not then a crime in Spain. The endangering public health charge had somehow lost its legs and as a result Puerto for all intents and purposes in Spain was over.
Nevertheless the damage rolled on as riders implicated, who had been cleared by their federations or national anti doping agencies, found it difficult to obtain a ride in a top tier team. Some of course were sanctioned – Ullrich and Basso the highest profile. Others, particularly those from Spain ended up either retiring or racing as refugees in Portugal.
In the end the sanction imposed on most of them has not been that meeted out by the courts, nor their federations, but it has been that dealt to them by the management and sponsors of the Pro Tour teams and the race organisers.. As the case of Allan Davis shows retribution for involvement in Puerto is not legal in the way we used to think about such things. Whatever the legal outcome retribution takes the form of an inability to obtain a contract with a decent team notwithstanding the ASADA finding him as having no case to answer. Some like Davis held out hopes that the Spanish Court of Appeal may give them some hope. But its reopening of the case has only confirmed the position that it is not the riders that the law is interested in.
In February 2008 the Spanish Court of Appeal reopened the case. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence for the endangering public health charge to be pursued and they directed judge Serrano to reopen his investigation into that charge. However, it may be that the most important finding of the Court of Appeal was that the cyclists had never engaged in fraud in respect of their employers or sponsors. This decision is important for riders such as Davis in so far as they continue to suffer at the hands of sponsors who fear the sullying of their good corporate names. The Court of Appeal finding suggests in fact that these very same sponsors have been all to well aware of the practices within their respective teams for too long – and thus are not in a position to have either their name sullied or to be defrauded.
The implication of this finding is clearly that the Court of Appeal felt that it was not only the sponsors that had knowledge of the fact that there had been a number of doping cases in cycling in recent years and that doping existed within cycling. This finding of the Court of Appeals undermines somewhat the rhetoric of cheating and fair play that pervades the discussion around doping in cycling in contemporary times and the situation whereby it is only cyclists who are taking the blame for the problem. For all the talk of cultural change in cycling, there is still little acknowledgment from the various levels of the sport's administration that they too were a part of cycling's old ways.
The Puerto files refers to various media reports, that of Roux, Manzano, Heras, Hamilton and Perez in particular. All of this suggests that widespread use of performance enhancing substances in cycling was common knowledge. Drugs in cycling have a long history. As we know it was Simpson's death that brought the health and safety of the cyclists into focus as anti doping controls developed during the 1960's. Even at the time of the Festina affair the ethos behind anti doping measures was health and safety. Only recently as that focus shifted to the rhetoric of fair play and cheating to be monitored by a bio-political passport regime.
Puerto also reveals a new post Festina 'post-modern' approach to the organisation of doping. Festina became criminalised because of the seizure of various illegal substances in poor old Willy Voet's team car. The riders, including Neil Stephens were held in police detention for days, almost blind Eric Zulle even being deprived of his glasses. The Festina affair exposed the old team based practices of preparation where team doctors themselves were responsible for the team's doping program. In the aftermath of Festina that system began to break down and it seems that is was replaced by a more networked and outsourced preparation system. Operacion Puerto exposes the outsourced network model that has existed in cycling in great detail. It also suggest that Liberty returned to a more team based approach as Saiz was aware of the dangers to his rider's health, not to say the team's reputation, if they were allowed to do their own thing.
Fuentes, Pantani and Chaba
The effect of Fuentes' practices on the health of the riders is one of the issues raised by the continuing post-appeal Guardia Civil investigation. Although there have been suggestions that the Guardia Civil may have investigated the links between Fuentes and Marco Pantani and Jose Maria Jimenez the references to these two riders in the Puerto files have not been widely speculated about in the media. The files call into question the assumption by Matt Rendell in his book, "The Death of Marco Pantani", that in his final year il Pirata was not doping.
Rendell documents Pantani's life during his last year in some detail. The plastic surgery, the outcome of the criminal and disciplinary trials and appeals, the visits to the psychiatrist and his doctors in Italy, the hospitalisations, the crack and cocaine binges, his retirement and final death on 14 February 2004. During this time it was thought that Pantani was, although using crack and cocaine after his retirement, for racing purposes, clean. Rendell recounts how doctors in Italy had warned him that racing itself might not be the best thing for his mental or physical health bu that racing doped was far more dangerous.
Nevertheless, it was in this same period, painstakingly documented by Rendell, that Puerto tells us that Pantani was also visiting Madrid and visiting Dr Fuentes. During Pantani's last season on the bike, the one immediately before his death, commencing late January 2004, Fuentes records set out an intense calendar of preparation including EPO (almost daily for over a month), IGF 1, T3 Levothroid, a hormone used in the treatment of menopause, and Insulin. The program lasted from late January until Pantani's retirement in June.
The coincidence between this program and Pantani's documented incidents of mental instability during his final year raise significant causes for concern as to the health implications of doping. In the context of the investigation into the charge that Fuentes endangered public health, it will be interesting to see if this coincidence or mis-incidence of events in Pantani's last year of life comes to light. And it should not be forgotten that another Fuentes patient who also suffered from depression and instability, Jose Maria Jimenez, died a little over 2 months before Pantani.
Why us?
In any conversation about Operacion Puerto there is always one point that comes up – Why cycling? Why us and not all those other sports that dope? Or that cyclists are the most tested athletes etc etc etc .... Whether details of other athletes were ever found by the Guardia Civil we may never know. If they did and why they have never come to light we can only speculate. But what we can say is that those other sports are far more established on a global scale than cycling is. And they have a different institutional sporting tradition to that of cycling. Unlike the others cycling now finds itself in the midst of a crisis of its globalisation. The change from a relatively small European based business into a global international media spectacle.
Cycling was always professional. The Tour grew out of the media's need to sell newspapers and doping quickly became the way that the "convicts of the route" managed to perform the impossible task set for them. Doping became a part of cycling culture as it operated outside the ethos of the amateur sporting world. Drugs became as one old Aussie pro put it to me the "tools of the trade". Like truckies on speed it was a way of getting the job done.
Cycling has always been run at a grass roots level, small groups, riders, managers, directors, like bands of gypsies. It was never big business – only recently did that occur. Only recently did cycling explode onto the world stage. The Armstrong years saw cycling develop into a global media product and with it a new level of scrutiny grew as the struggle to control the emerging global product intensified..
Cultural change in cycling is being driven by the fight over global cycling tv rights. This is what is at the heart5 of the battle between the Grand Tours and the UCI – a potential multi million dollar tv product in which the Tours which to retain their control over their race and the UCI wish to 'nationalise' or integrate into one grand package. In this situation rumour and suspicion serve as the cipher by which the battle is played out and points are scored against the other side.
In this context of cultural change it is ony the riders being subjected to scrutiny and not those who have managed the sport for many years and who it seem have kown what was happening the whole time. But it is only he cyclists who are risking losing their livelihood. There are exceptions such as with Fuentes or the odd director, but even they come back in one way or another.
True cultural change within cycling depends upon it being accepted that it was not just the cyclists involved in doping. It involves a recognition that the practice was widely known about and accepted by those in the know – administrators, sponsors and the media. But at the moment with the riders being criminalised and those others involved in the sport mouthing the mantras of 'zero tolerance' and 'cultural change' real change is impossible. What is needed is some process of truth and reconciliation within cycling. A moratorium on the old ways on the part of the riders and in turn a moratorium on the persecution of old events. Only with this recognition and by biting the bullet and accepting that we were all a part of the problem can we really have true cultural change in cycling. But none of this can happen when riders are turned into criminals and the organisers of the loggerheads continue to applaud this as they battle it out to be the top dog in a global cycling market. Operacion Puerto and cycling require tough political decisions to be made – by administrators, race organisers and cyclists; the solution will not come about through the law.
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