Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Norwegian study on Athlete Whereabouts system

This article is interesting but it doesn't really do justice to the arguments against the whereabouts system. The authors promise an empirical study in the near future. If anyone wants a copy to read email me.I'll post some notes on the article after re-reading it.


Elite athletes' duty to provide information on their whereabouts: Justifiable anti-doping work or an indefensible surveillance regime?


Authors: Dag Vidar Hanstad a; Sigmund Loland a

Affiliation: a Norwegian School of Sport Sciences, Oslo, Norway

DOI: 10.1080/17461390802594219


Published in: journal European Journal of Sport Science, Volume 9, Issue 1 January 2009 , pages 3 - 10
Subject: Sport & Exercise Science;


Abstract

In this article, we explain and reflect critically upon the athlete whereabouts reporting system in top-level sports initiated by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). This system makes it compulsory for athletes who are in a registered testing pool in their national and/or international federation to submit information about their whereabouts. In this way, athletes are required to be available for a no advance notice doping test throughout the year. If an athlete provides incorrect information or cannot be found when a no advance notice test is supposed to be taken (a missed test), he or she may be given a warning. In most sports and national anti-doping regulations, three such warnings within 18 months may be regarded as a violation of the doping regulations and may lead to exclusion from sport for between 3 months and 2 years. The system is controversial. In this article, we examine the key objections to the system and, more specifically, objections connected to ideas of justice and athletes' autonomy and right to self-determination. The argument will be a practical ethical one informed by a survey on attitudes towards the whereabouts system carried out among 236 athletes belonging to the registered testing pool in Norway. We conclude that if the basic principles of anti-doping work are accepted, WADA's whereabouts reporting system represents nothing other than an efficient extension of this work.

Keywords: Anti-doping; elite athletes; whereabouts reporting system; surveillance

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Que CERA CERA

and the current faves post cera seem to be

Luteinizing hormone

Adrenocorticotropic hormone

IGF-1

S107

Coyle and Armstrong

If you have read LA Confidential or D. Walsh's book Lance to Landis .... you would have seen that Greg Lemond was sceptical about the work of Dr Coyle.

The Science of Sport has posted some reviews of Coyle's work which calls it into doubt ...

Coyle and Armstrong: Research "errors" evaluation

The Coyle study on Armstrong: A "minor error" or a scientific "hoax?" Analysis and insight

Coyle-Armstrong research installment 2

The "error" is discovered, thanks to scientific detective work

Coyle continued

"I made a mistake." Now get a job"...Fact and philosophy

Monday, February 2, 2009

Doping and Australian Professional Cycling: Attitudes, Issues and a Pathway to a New Approach.

version en español

Submission to the Commonwealth Department of Health Anti Doping Research Program by Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law


Project Summary

Cycling has a reputation as having an entrenched doping culture existing within a closed community where some bending of the rules has been seen as historically permissible, if not required in order to cope with the exceptional nature of its events. The closed nature of the peloton is regarded as being one of the greatest challenges for any intervention initiated from the outside (see Dauncey, 2003; Schneider, 2006). The objective of this research is to examine the attitudes of Australia professional cyclists ("the Australian peloton") and those that they interact with including team managers and staff, sporting and medical advisors, sporting administrators, sponsors and government (“their cohort”). This research is critical given the current doping policy paradigm, its operation, effectiveness and limitations. This study seeks to identify factors which lead to the current anti doping regime to be less effective than desired and to propose practical measures to increase that effectiveness.

Currently the Australian peloton includes at least 30 members racing in European based professional teams and another 80 members riding in continental professional teams outside of Europe. In 2007, Australia was ranked 3rd in the world and 4th following the 2008 World Championships. Given the long history of interaction between professional cycling in Australia and the rest of the world, particularly Europe, the Australia peloton provides an experienced but manageable sized group with which to engage in order to undertake such a project. Furthermore, given the history of interaction with Europe and other parts of the cycling world, there is nothing to suggest that the Australia situation vis a vis doping and attitudes to anti-doping policy are any different within the Australian peloton than any other highly ranked cycling nation.

Over the past decade the sport has been subjected to a number of internal crises and increasing external scrutiny. Nevertheless the problem of doping and how effectively to deal with it remain an important and unresolved issue. The last ten years have seen increased scrutiny of professional cycling, in a large part due to the events of the 1998 Tour de France involving the Festina and other teams. In fact this event is in part credited with the movement towards the formation of WADA. More recently there has been the Operacion Puerto enquiry in Spain, and the successive problems associated with the last three editions of the Tour de France (2006 – Landis; 2007 – Rasmussen, Vinokourov, Mayo; 2008 - Kohl, Schumacher, Ricco & Piepoli) which have raised the issue as to the effectiveness of current anti doping policy and its attempts at changing behaviour in relation to doping practices within cycling.


The observations of Schneider (2006) concerning the closed nature of the peloton as a barrier to change are enlightening in the context of the developments of anti-doping policy over the last 10 years. During this time outside intervention has taken the form of criminal investigations, the development of a World Anti Doping Agency and Code, the changing nature and frequency of testing within cycling and the development of biological passports. As can be seen from this brief list, anti doping policy has been concerned primarily with detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment. In short, anti doping has been a policing activity, and as such it appears to have failed to engage those who are the objects of that activity, nor has it led to broad cultural change within the sport. It is arguable that these measures have in fact contributed towards the peloton becoming even more closed and as a result incapable of fully grasping the nature of the changes occurring within the sport.

Without engaging cyclists (other than as objects of surveillance and prosecution) it is arguable that it is becoming evident to sporting administrators that the current anti doping policy pursued within the sport of cycling is not as effective as it could be and has not as yet led to widespread cultural change of attitudes within the peloton. Without more education it is arguable that such a policy is unsustainable. This is compounded when it is noted that a great deal of the current policy has been formulated as a result of media and related crises within cycling. Schneider (2006) has remarked that the history of the nature of the problem of doping in cycling is constructed in large part from the extensive media coverage of it. As a result of policy being media or crisis driven it appears that little sociological or legal research has been undertaken which considers the relationship between those who are the object of this policing and those who are doing the policing.


Due to the forces of globalisation there are real processes occurring which interact with and effect the development of elite sport policy globally. The current context and changes occurring within professional cycling may well be characterised as processes of structural re-adjustment whereby the old European based cycling economy is being subjected to the pressures of the globalisation of the sport. Anti-doping policy and the fact that cycling is in the ‘eye of the storm’ has to be viewed within this context. These factors not only include the substantive policy framework in terms of an increasingly global anti doping legislative regime but also the discursive construction of those processes within subsystems, communities and the media. As both Houlihan (2005) and Schneider (2006) have noted to some extent, it is the discursive constructions that tend to shape and mediate policy production processes. Dauncey (2003) has also recognised that cycling has a particularly complicated normative framework or frameworks. He has identified at least four normative frameworks that constrain and direct participation in an event such as the Tour de France including the rules of the race, the rules of society, culture and politics, international views on sports and ethics and the internal rules of the peloton itself. Within these frameworks there exist a number of groups that form a broad policy community or communities. However, not all actors within the purview of such communities are able to openly voice their concerns within such a community, especially when one of those policy communities, the peloton, seeks to protect its interests through silence.


In undertaking this research the project will adopt and apply the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Houlihan (2005) in his work on elite sports policy development. The ACF framework will also be informed by practice, context and the notions of reflexive sociology pursued by Bourdieu (1992, 1990). The ACF focuses upon identifying the dominant policy paradigms that set the parameters for any policy change and the discursive story lines or rationales of those involved in or affected by policy development. Finally the ACF model proposes the concept of policy brokerage in order to engage those involved in and affected by policy changes in order to achieve the neatest possible marriage between the rhetoric of the policy and the reality of the practice it seeks to address.


Full Text of Submission

Sunday, February 1, 2009

DNA Testing, Right to Private and Family Life and Limitations on Rights

Extract from the European Court of Human Rights Decision:

Case of S. and Marper v. The United Kingdom


Summary



The case of S and Marper v United Kingdom considered whether the retention of DNA and fingerprints from innocent people is consistent with human rights law.

This case will be particularly informative for the interpretation and application of s 13 (privacy) and s 7 (limitations) of the Victorian Charter (Australia).

Facts

The first applicant, Mr S, was charged with attempted robbery at the age of eleven. His fingerprints and DNA samples were taken and he was subsequently acquitted.

The second applicant, Mr Marper, was arrested and charged with harassment of his partner. His fingerprints and DNA sample were taken. The charge was not pressed and the case was formally discontinued.

Both applicants asked for their fingerprints and DNA samples to be destroyed, but in both cases,the police refused.

Decision

In making its decision, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights considered the following

1. whether the retention by the authorities of the applicants’ fingerprints, DNA profiles and cellular samples constituted an interference in their private life; and

2. if so, whether the interference was: (a) in accordance with the law; (b) in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and (c) necessary in a democratic society.

The Grand Chamber decided that the retention of both cellular samples and DNA profiles constituted an interference with the right to respect for the private lives of the applicants within the meaning of art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference.

Further, the Grand Chamber found that the interference was not justified. In this regard, the

Grand Chamber stated:

the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences,fails to strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests.


Accordingly, the retention constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicants’right to respect for private life and cannot be regarding as necessary in a democratic society.



Extract


A. Council of Europe texts

# The Council of Europe Convention of 1981 for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data (“the Data Protection Convention”), which entered into force for the United Kingdom on 1 December 1987, defines “personal data” as any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (“data subject”). The Convention provides inter alia:

“Article 5 – Quality of data

Personal data undergoing automatic processing shall be: ...

b. stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way incompatible with those purposes;

c. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are stored;

...

e. preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the purpose for which those data are stored.

Article 6 – Special categories of data

Personal data revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as personal data concerning health or sexual life, may not be processed automatically unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards. (...)

Article 7 – Data security

Appropriate security measures shall be taken for the protection of personal data stored in automated data files against accidental or unauthorised destruction or accidental loss as well as against unauthorised access, alteration or dissemination.”

# Recommendation No. R(87)15 regulating the use of personal data in the police sector (adopted on 17 September 1987) states, inter alia:

“Principle 2 – Collection of data

2.1 The collection of personal data for police purposes should be limited to such as is necessary for the prevention of a real danger or the suppression of a specific criminal offence. Any exception to this provision should be the subject of specific national legislation. ...

Principle 3 - Storage of data

3.1. As far as possible, the storage of personal data for police purposes should be limited to accurate data and to such data as are necessary to allow police bodies to perform their lawful tasks within the framework of national law and their obligations arising from international law....

Principle 7 - Length of storage and updating of data

7.1. Measures should be taken so that personal data kept for police purposes are deleted if they are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were stored.

For this purpose, consideration shall in particular be given to the following criteria: the need to retain data in the light of the conclusion of an inquiry into a particular case; a final judicial decision, in particular an acquittal; rehabilitation; spent convictions; amnesties; the age of the data subject, particular categories of data.”

# Recommendation No. R(92)1 on the use of analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) within the framework of the criminal justice system (adopted on 10 February 1992) states, inter alia:

“3. Use of samples and information derived therefrom

Samples collected for DNA analysis and the information derived from such analysis for the purpose of the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences must not be used for other purposes. ...

Samples taken for DNA analysis and the information so derived may be needed for research and statistical purposes. Such uses are acceptable provided the identity of the individual cannot be ascertained. Names or other identifying references must therefore be removed prior to their use for these purposes.

4. Taking of samples for DNA analysis


The taking of samples for DNA analysis should only be carried out in circumstances determined by the domestic law; it being understood that in some states this may necessitate specific authorisation from a judicial authority...


8. Storage of samples and data

Samples or other body tissue taken from individuals for DNA analysis should not be kept after the rendering of the final decision in the case for which they were used, unless it is necessary for purposes directly linked to those for which they were collected.

Measures should be taken to ensure that the results of DNA analysis are deleted when it is no longer necessary to keep it for the purposes for which it was used. The results of DNA analysis and the information so derived may, however, be retained where the individual concerned has been convicted of serious offences against the life, integrity or security of persons. In such cases strict storage periods should be defined by domestic law.

Samples and other body tissues, or the information derived from them, may be stored for longer periods:

- when the person so requests; or

- when the sample cannot be attributed to an individual, for example when it is found at the scene of a crime;

Where the security of the state is involved, the domestic law of the member state may permit retention of the samples, the results of DNA analysis and the information so derived even though the individual concerned has not been charged or convicted of an offence. In such cases strict storage periods should be defined by domestic law. ...”

# The Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation stated, as regards item 8:

“47. The working party was well aware that the drafting of Recommendation 8 was a delicate matter, involving different protected interests of a very difficult nature. It was necessary to strike the right balance between these interests. Both the European Convention on Human Rights and the Data Protection Convention provide exceptions for the interests of the suppression of criminal offences and the protection of the rights and freedoms of third parties. However, the exceptions are only allowed to the extent that they are compatible with what is necessary in a democratic society. ...

49. Since the primary aim of the collection of samples and the carrying out of DNA analysis on such samples is the identification of offenders and the exoneration of suspected offenders, the data should be deleted once persons have been cleared of suspicion. The issue then arises as to how long the DNA findings and the samples on which they were based can be stored in the case of a finding of guilt.

50. The general rule should be that the data are deleted when they are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were collected and used. This would in general be the case when a final decision has been rendered as to the culpability of the offender. By 'final decision' the CAHBI thought that this would normally, under domestic law, refer to a judicial decision. However, the working party recognised that there was a need to set up data bases in certain cases and for specific categories of offences which could be considered to constitute circumstances warranting another solution, because of the seriousness of the offences. The working party came to this conclusion after a thorough analysis of the relevant provisions in the European Convention on Human Rights, the Data Protection Convention and other legal instruments drafted within the framework of the Council of Europe. In addition, the working party took into consideration that all member states keep a criminal record and that such record may be used for the purposes of the criminal justice system... It took into account that such an exception would be permissible under certain strict conditions:

- when there has been a conviction;

- when the conviction concerns a serious criminal offence against the life, integrity and security of a person;

- the storage period is limited strictly;

- the storage is defined and regulated by law;

- the storage is subject to control by Parliament or an independent supervisory body...”


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